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INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: DO TRIPS’ 
FLEXIBILITIES PERMIT SUFFICIENT 
ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HIV/AIDS 
MEDICINES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
Alexandra G. Watson* 
Abstract: The World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement seeks to standardize intellec-
tual property laws around the world. TRIPS is controversial because, in ef-
fect, it limits access to affordable HIV/AIDS medicines in nations where 
they are desperately needed. This Note argues that although TRIPS’ 
compulsory licensing provision is an invaluable tool for improving access 
to affordable medicines, a tiered-pricing scheme in concert with a ban on 
parallel imports would help secure universally lower drug prices. 
Introduction 
 The notion of international protection for intellectual property 
rights stirs up emotional dilemmas.1 Pharmaceutical companies invest 
billions of dollars to research and develop innovative new medicines, 
and the only way to recoup these costs and incentivize future research 
is to grant companies temporary monopolies on their innovations and 
allow them to charge high prices for patented medicines.2 At the same 
time, the World Health Organization estimates that half the population 
in regions of Africa and Asia lacks access to essential medicines.3 Fur-
ther, patent protection itself is a foreign concept in many of these na-
tions, and forcing them to abide by international intellectual property 
                                                                                                                      
* Alexandra G. Watson is a Senior Note Editor for the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 See A Gathering Storm: Drugs Companies’ Patents Are Under Attack, Economist, June 9, 
2007, at 100. 
2 See John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding 
the Proper Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7 Widener L. Symp. J. 
175, 187 (2001). 
3 Scott Lucyk, Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to Essential Medicines Under the 
TRIPS Agreement, 38 Ottawa L. Rev. 191, 193 (2006). 
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agreements seems to be an unfair imposition of Western values.4 The 
question remains: How can pharmaceutical companies be compen-
sated adequately for their exorbitant expenses and, at the same time, 
poor nations be ensured access to affordable HIV/AIDS medicines?5 
 Given the increasing interconnectedness of global markets, protect-
ing intellectual property on an international scale has become a critical 
concern for the World Trade Organization (WTO).6 In response to 
pressure from developed countries such as the United States, the WTO 
passed the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) in 1994.7 Each of the more than 150 WTO member-
states was required to ratify the Agreement.8 TRIPS attempts to create a 
global intellectual property consensus by requiring nations to establish 
minimum baseline intellectual property laws.9 The Agreement also pro-
vides exceptions for rare circumstances.10 
 A crucial flexibility contained in TRIPS is compulsory licensing, 
which is the process by which a government compels a patent-holder 
to license its rights to a generic manufacturer in exchange for com-
pensation.11 Global health advocates praise the increased use of com-
pulsory licensing because it leads to lower-priced medicines, but drug 
executives insist that the method was intended to be used only as a 
last resort during emergencies.12 
 This Note first discusses the WTO’s adoption of TRIPS and several 
subsequent initiatives and outlines the flexibilities that they provide. 
Next, this Note highlights the controversies surrounding TRIPS and 
compulsory licensing and it introduces possible improvements. Finally, 
this Note analyzes how effectively TRIPS achieves its competing goals 
                                                                                                                      
4 Naomi Bass, Implication of the TRIPS Agreement for Developing Countries: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Law in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Century, 34 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 191, 
205 (2002). 
5 Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade 
Organization’s Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 A. Bus. 
L.J. 353, 356 (2004). 
6 See Harrelson, supra note 2, at 175. 
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 
81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [hereinaf-
ter TRIPS]; see Sherman & Oakley, supra note 5, at 362; Bass, supra note 4, at 196. 
8 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 1. 
9 See id. art. 33. 
10 Id. art. 31. 
11 Id.; see Bass, supra note 4, at 198--99. 
12 A Gathering Storm, supra note 1, at 100. 
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and proposes ways to enhance the current international intellectual 
property system. 
I. Background 
A. TRIPS and Its Progeny: A Chronology of Initiatives 
 International intellectual property rights are not a new idea.13 The 
Paris Convention, signed in 1883, was an early international agreement 
to address the subject.14 Nevertheless, it merely required nations to of-
fer the same patent protection to foreign inventors that they provided 
to domestic innovators.15 Moreover, there was no mode of enforcement 
and thus the Convention was essentially a guideline that nations were 
free to ignore.16 In 1967, the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO) was formed, but it was criticized for favoring the needs of de-
veloping nations and failing to provide substantial international intel-
lectual property protections.17 These disappointing initiatives ultimately 
led to the formation of the WTO and the adoption of the TRIPS 
agreement.18 
 Following proposals by the United States and Japan, as well as years 
of negotiations, the WTO adopted TRIPS during the 1994 Uruguay 
Round negotiations.19 TRIPS protects various types of intellectual 
property, including pharmaceuticals, by mandating that signatories 
adopt patent laws conforming to the minimum standards enunciated in 
the Agreement.20 Specifically, TRIPS requires member- states to provide 
at least twenty years of patent protection for innovators.21 Nevertheless, 
the Agreement also allows for exceptions in rare circumstances.22 Most 
significantly, TRIPS lists the situations in which a country may engage 
in compulsory licensing, a process by which a government authorizes a 
manufacturer to produce a patented item without the patent-owner’s 
                                                                                                                      
13 See Harrelson, supra note 2, at 178. 
14 See id. at 178--79. 
15 Id. 
16 See id. 
17 See Bass, supra note 4, at 195. 
18 See id. at 195–96. 
19 See Katherina Gamharter, Access to Affordable Medicines 9 (2004). 
20 Id. at 16. 
21 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 33. 
22 Id. art. 31. 
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permission.23 TRIPS also contains dispute settlement provisions, a fea-
ture that its predecessors lacked.24 
 In response to questions from developing countries about how 
strictly TRIPS would be interpreted, the WTO issued a Declaration on 
TRIPS and Public Health at a conference in Doha, Qatar, in 2001.25 
The Doha Declaration clarified various aspects of TRIPS and generally 
loosened developing nations’ obligations under the Agreement.26 Spe-
cifically, it stated that TRIPS “can and should be interpreted and im-
plemented in a manner supportive of WTO members’ right to protect 
public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for 
all.”27 This was considered a major victory for developing nations.28 The 
Declaration also extended the deadline for developing nations to com-
ply with TRIPS’ requirements until 2016.29 
 In August 2003, the WTO General Counsel addressed another lin-
gering issue: the fact that nations lacking manufacturing capabilities 
were unable to use TRIPS’ compulsory licensing provision.30 TRIPS 
Article 31(f) requires that compulsory licensing be used “predomi-
nantly” to supply goods to a nation’s domestic market.31 This serves to 
limit compulsory licensing in the developing world, as many poorer 
nations lack the technological resources to produce pharmaceuticals.32 
The WTO’s 2003 decision addressed this deficiency by creating a waiver 
for TRIPS Article 31(f), allowing member-states to export generic drugs 
to poorer nations.33 The 2003 decision is frequently referred to as the 
                                                                                                                      
23 Id. 
24 Id. art. 64; Harrelson, supra note 2, at 178--79. 
25 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN 
(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/min- 
ist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see Brittany Whobrey, Interna-
tional Patent Law and Public Health: Analyzing TRIPS’ Effect on Access to Pharmaceuticals in Develop-
ing Countries, 45 Brandeis L.J. 623, 635--36 (2007); see also Gamharter, supra note 19, at 121--
31 (describing lengthy negotiation process). 
26 See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 5, at 358--59. 
27 Doha Declaration, supra note 25, para. 4. 
28 See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 5, at 379--80. 
29 Doha Declaration, supra note 25, para. 7. 
30 See Decision of General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declara-
tion on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr. 1, at para. 2 (Aug. 
30, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm 
[hereinafter Paragraph Six Decision]; L. Danielle Tully, Prospects for Progress: The TRIPS Agree-
ment and Developing Countries After the Doha Conference, 26 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 129, 142--
43 (2003) (describing Doha Declaration’s limited usefulness in developing nations). 
31 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(f). 
32 See Whobrey, supra note 25, at 636. 
33 See Paragraph Six Decision, supra note 30, para. 2; Whobrey, supra note 25, at 636. 
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Paragraph Six Decision because the sixth paragraph of the Doha Dec-
laration specifically identified the manufacturing capabilities issue. 34 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the United States agreed to the Paragraph 
Six Decision on the condition that the exportation method was to be 
used solely to address public health needs and was not for commercial 
purposes.35 This extra condition led some public health groups to con-
clude that the Decision was doomed because developing countries, 
many of which lack organized governmental infrastructures, would be 
discouraged by the bureaucratic “red tape.”36 The Decision contains 
other restrictions, as well; for instance, states that utilize the compul-
sory licensing provisions must fulfill notification obligations and follow 
several other complicated steps.37 
 Since the Paragraph Six Decision was issued, many developed 
countries have pledged not to use the waiver provision to import cheap 
generic drugs.38 Several other countries have announced that they will 
not use the waiver unfairly but instead will utilize it only during na-
tional emergencies.39 Perhaps as a result of the pervasive perception 
that developed countries will exert pressure on nations that use the 
new mechanism, only one country has done so thus far.40 In October 
2007, Canada issued a compulsory license for the production and ex-
port of a generic AIDS medicine to Rwanda.41 
 In December 2005, WTO members agreed to incorporate the 2003 
waivers into the TRIPS Agreement permanently.42 The amendment will 
                                                                                                                      
34 See Doha Declaration, supra note 25, para. 6; World Trade Organization, Frequently 
asked questions: Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, http://www.wto.org/ 
english/ tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
35 See Elizabeth Becker, Poor Nations Can Purchase Cheap Drugs Under Accord, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 31, 2003, at 1. 
36 Id. 
37 Paragraph Six Decision, supra note 30, para. 2; see Gamharter, supra note 19, at 
275. 
38 Paragraph Six Decision, supra note 30, n.3; World Trade Organization, TRIPS and 
Public Health: The Situation in Late 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
health_background_e.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
39 TRIPS and Public Health: The Situation in Late 2005, supra note 38. 
40 See John Boscariol, Canada Is First to Grant WTO Compulsory License for Export of Generic 
Drug, Mondaq Bus. Briefing, Nov. 2, 2007. 
41 Id.; Canada Allows Apotex to Manufacture Generics for Rwanda, Pharma Bus. Daily Bull., 
Oct. 10, 2007; World Trade Organization, TRIPS and Public Health ‘Paragraph 6’ System: 
Notifications by Importing WTO Members, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
public_health_notif_import_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Notifications] (last visited Nov. 21, 
2008). 
42 See World Trade Organization, Fact Sheet: TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents (Sept. 
2006), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/factsheet_pharm00_e.htm [herein-
after WTO Fact Sheet]; Whobrey, supra note 25, at 637--38. 
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enter into force when two-thirds of WTO members ratify it, which was 
originally expected to occur by the end of 2007.43 In December 2007, 
the General Council decided to extend the deadline by two years until 
the end of 2009.44 Thus far, eighteen members, including the United 
States and the European Union (EU), have officially accepted the 
amendment.45 
B. TRIPS’ Flexibilities in Detail: Compulsory Licensing  
and Parallel Importation 
 The TRIPS Agreement permits compulsory licensing in a section 
entitled, “Other use without authorization of the right holder.”46 Ac-
cording to the Agreement, the entity or individual applying for a com-
pulsory license first must attempt to obtain a voluntary license from the 
patent-holder.47 If that effort is unsuccessful, the government may issue 
a compulsory license and the license-user must provide the patent-
owner with monetary compensation.48 
 Nevertheless, TRIPS permits exceptions during national emer-
gencies and other urgent situations.49 In these instances, the user is 
not obliged to make an initial attempt to secure a voluntary license.50 
The Doha Declaration further loosened this national emergency ex-
ception by allowing nations to develop their own definitions of “na-
tional emergency.”51 In addition, TRIPS previously reserved compul-
sory licensing for domestic uses, but the 2003 Paragraph Six Decision 
made it possible for developing nations to import copies of drugs that 
they are incapable of manufacturing domestically.52 
 Parallel importation is another crucial avenue of drug access for 
developing nations.53 This occurs when a manufacturer sells a medicine 
                                                                                                                      
43 World Trade Organization, Countries accepting amendment of the TRIPS Agree-
ment, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (last visited Nov. 
21, 2008); Whobrey, supra note 25, at 637--38. 
44 Countries accepting amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 43. 
45 Id.; Andrew Bounds, World News: EU Paves Way for Access to Generic Medicines, Finan-
cial Times Europe, Oct. 25, 2007, at 3. 
46 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31. Although the words “compulsory licensing” do not ap-
pear in the TRIPS Agreement, the WTO has stated that the practice falls under this broad 
heading. WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 42. 
47 See TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 31(b). 
48 Id. art. 31(b), (h). 
49 Id. art. 31(b). 
50 Id. 
51 Doha Declaration, supra note 25, para. 5(c). 
52 See Paragraph Six Decision, supra note 25. 
53 See Harrelson, supra note 2, at 192. 
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to different countries at varying prices, and a buyer purchases the drug 
from the country with the lowest price.54 Thus, if a patent-holder sold a 
drug to country A for $1.00 and country B for $5.00, and a company 
buys the drug cheaply in country A and imports it into country B, par-
allel importing has occurred.55 The legal principle behind parallel im-
portation is “exhaustion;” once a company sells a batch of its product, it 
no longer has any rights over the batch; and thus its rights have been 
exhausted.56 By extension, there are no restrictions on what the new 
owner of the product can do with it.57 While the doctrine of exhaustion 
is recognized on a national level, the concept of ‘international exhaus-
tion’ is hotly contested.58 
 Because the issue is so divisive, TRIPS does not expressly permit or 
prohibit the practice of parallel importation.59 In fact, the Agreement 
explicitly states, “[N]othing in this Agreement shall be used to address 
the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”60 The Doha 
Declaration reiterated that member-states can address parallel importa-
tion on an individual basis according to their domestic policy goals.61 
Currently, parallel importation is a common practice, especially within 
the European Union.62 
II. Discussion 
A. General Tension over TRIPS 
 TRIPS has been a source of controversy since its inception.63 Some 
developing countries protest that patents are a Western concept and 
TRIPS forces Western values on their cultures.64 Indeed, some cultures 
in developing nations value shared knowledge and reject the competi-
tiveness embodied in TRIPS.65 Furthermore, intellectual property laws 
                                                                                                                      
54 Whobrey, supra note 25, at 632-33. 
55 See WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 42, at 5; Whobrey, supra note 25, at 632--33. 
56 WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 42, at 5. 
57 See id. 
58 See Holger Hestermeyer, Human Rights and the WTO 230 (2007). 
59 See WTO Fact Sheet, supra note 42, at 5; Sherman & Oakley, supra note 5, at 373. 
60 TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 6. 
61 Doha Declaration, supra note 25, para. 5(d). 
62 See Harrelson, supra note 2, at 193. 
63 See Rosalyn S. Park, The International Drug Industry: What the Future Holds for South Af-
rica’s HIV/AIDS Patients, 11 Minn. J. Global Trade 125, 134 (2002); Bass, supra note 4, at 
199--201; Whobrey, supra note 25, at 624. 
64 See Bass, supra note 4, at 205. 
65 See id. 
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may seem unnecessary in developing countries with few resources and 
low levels of technological development.66 Developing countries object 
most forcefully to the implementation of Western values in an area of 
great concern to them: access to affordable pharmaceuticals.67 Justifia-
bly, these nations fear that TRIPS will limit access to crucial medications 
by raising prices.68 
 By stark contrast, the United States, other developed nations, and 
the pharmaceutical industry have complained that TRIPS is too leni-
ent.69 In particular, they oppose the transitional grace periods for com-
pliance provided to developing countries and TRIPS’ built-in flexibil-
ities, such as compulsory licensing.70 Indeed, the United States’ 
insistence on an additional statement in the Paragraph Six Decision 
regarding commercial use exemplifies its tough approach to TRIPS.71 
B. The Debate over Compulsory Licensing 
 The controversy over compulsory licensing, especially in the con-
text of desperately needed HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals, rightly has 
been referred to as “an emotional battleground.”72 Of all HIV-infected 
patients, eighty-nine percent live in the poorest ten percent of all na-
tions.73 In the United States, the annual cost of HIV/AIDS drugs is 
more than $10,000, a cost which is far beyond the means of almost all 
patients in developing countries.74 Therefore, compulsory licensing 
has clear appeal because it lowers prices.75 
 Interestingly, developing countries can benefit from compulsory 
licensing even when they do not implement the method.76 In the past, 
mere threats to issue compulsory licenses have motivated pharmaceu-
tical companies to quickly drop their prices.77 In 2001, for instance, 
Brazil threatened to issue a compulsory license for an AIDS drug 
                                                                                                                      
66 Whobrey, supra note 25, at 629. 
67 See Bass, supra note 4, at 205. 
68 See id. at 204--05. 
69 Id. at 205. 
70 Id. at 205--06. 
71 See Becker, supra note 35, at 1. 
72 Harrelson, supra note 2, at 189. 
73 Id. 
74 See id. at 190. 
75 See id. at 190--91. 
76 See Bonita de Boer, TRIPS, AIDS & Generic Drugs, Aug. 8, 2007, www.avert.org/generic. 
htm; TRIPS and Public Health: The situation in late 2005, supra note 38. 
77 See Jennifer L. Rich, Roche Reaches Accord on Drug with Brazil, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 
2001, at C1. 
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produced by Swiss pharmaceutical company Roche Holding, and the 
company reacted by lowering its prices to about thirty percent of the 
price in the United States.78 To the relief of the pharmaceutical indus-
try, Brazil agreed to the discount; drug companies had feared that 
other developing nations would follow Brazil’s example and issue 
compulsory licenses for much-needed medicines.79 
 Unfortunately, compulsory licensing suffers from several notable 
shortcomings, including the fact that many poor nations do not employ 
the method for fear of trade sanctions or business repercussions.80 In-
deed, developed countries and pharmaceutical companies have not 
hesitated in the past to exert pressure on nations with weak intellectual 
property laws.81 As evidenced by the fact that only one country has used 
the new Paragraph Six method in the years since its adoption, nations 
are cautious about potentially exposing themselves to a mountain of 
international pressure.82 This remains a pressing problem, as many de-
veloping countries lack pharmaceutical manufacturing capabilities.83 
 The United States’ actions toward Brazil’s intellectual property laws 
exemplify the developed world’s approach to weak intellectual property 
regimes. In 1987, even before TRIPS was enacted, the United States im-
posed “Special 301” sanctions on Brazil because it considered Brazil’s 
flimsy intellectual property laws and failure to denounce piracy of 
pharmaceuticals to be unacceptable.84 The sanctions consisted of a one 
hundred percent tariff on Brazilian imports to the United States.85 After 
the passage of TRIPS, Brazil enacted its Industrial Property Law in an 
attempt to meet its new obligations under the Agreement.86 This new 
law required that foreign goods seeking Brazilian patent protection be 
produced at least partially within Brazil.87 As a result, the United States 
filed a complaint with the WTO in 2001.88 Ultimately, the United States 
withdrew its complaint following much international pressure.89 
                                                                                                                      
78 Id. 
79 See id. 
80 See Harrelson, supra note 2, at 189. 
81 See Whobrey, supra note 25, at 624. 
82 See Boscariol, supra note 40; Rich, supra note 77, at C1. 
83 See Whobrey, supra note 25, at 636. 
84 See Bass, supra note 4, at 206--07. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. at 208 (describing the United States’ allegation that the Industrial Property 
Law violated TRIPS Article 27, which prohibits discrimination against foreign manufacture 
of goods). 
89 See Bass, supra note 4, at 208. 
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 The international community also took a strong stance against one 
of South Africa’s laws.90 In 1997, South Africa passed the Medicines and 
Related Substances Control Amendment Act (Medicines Act), which 
empowered the Minister of Health to use sweeping measures, such as 
unrestricted compulsory licensing, during health emergencies.91 The 
United States and various organizations considered these provisions to 
be TRIPS violations, and as a result, the United States placed South Af-
rica on its “watch list” in 1998 and attempted to challenge the Medi-
cines Act before the WTO.92 Furthermore, upon passage of the Medi-
cines Act, the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association (PMA) of 
South Africa filed a lawsuit against the South African government on 
behalf of forty domestic and international drug companies.93 In re-
sponse to public pressure, the United States removed South Africa 
from its list in 2001 and issued a statement acknowledging the AIDS 
epidemic, and the PMA dropped its suit.94 Nevertheless, the United 
States has continued to closely monitor South Africa’s patent protec-
tions.95 
 More recently, Thailand was targeted for the perceived weaknesses 
in its intellectual property practices.96 In January 2007, Thailand ap-
proved a compulsory license for an AIDS drug, thereby allowing its 
domestic drug makers to copy the patent-holder’s formula and sell the 
medicine in Thailand at a low price.97 Shortly thereafter, the United 
States elevated Thailand to its “priority watch list” and EU Trade Com-
missioner Peter Mandelson wrote a letter to the nation attacking its 
weak intellectual property standards.98 Even more devastatingly, the 
patent’s owner, Abbott, announced that it would no longer sell seven of 
its newest products in Thailand, including a highly desirable heat-stable 
AIDS medicine.99 The United States claimed that its actions were based 
on Thailand’s cumulative disregard for intellectual property, as well as 
                                                                                                                      
90 See id. at 210--13. 
91 Id. at 210--11. 
92 See id. at 211--12; Sherman & Oakley, supra note 5, at 395. 
93  Park, supra note 63, at 137. 
94 See Bass, supra note 4, at 212; Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit 
Over AIDS Medicine, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 2001, at A1. 
95 See Harrelson, supra note 2, at 185. 
96 Lara Santoro, Forget the Patents on AIDS Drugs; Third World Nations Have the Right, and 
the Duty, to Produce Generic Versions, L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 2007, at 17. 
97 Id. 
98 See id. 
99 Keith Alcorn, Abbott To Withhold New Drugs from Thailand in Retaliation for Kaletra Com-
pulsory License, Mar. 15, 2007, http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/00C7641B-57F5-4AB8- 
8876-9040425D4464.asp. 
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its failure to include all stakeholders in the discussions leading up to 
the issuance of the license.100 It did, however, acknowledge Thailand’s 
legal right under TRIPS to issue a compulsory license.101 
 Thus there is a strong international perception that developed 
nations and the pharmaceutical industry will react swiftly and harshly 
to what they perceive to be intellectual property infractions.102 The 
threat of trade sanctions or other business repercussions is alarming 
to developing nations that are already in desperate economic posi-
tions.103 As a result, developing countries are hesitant to issue compul-
sory licenses, especially for Paragraph Six purposes.104 
 Besides instilling fear of sanctions in developing countries, another 
drawback to compulsory licensing is that it arguably destroys the phar-
maceutical companies’ incentives to research and develop medicines to 
treat the diseases that strike developing countries.105 If the pharmaceu-
tical industry’s fears are realized and compulsory licensing becomes a 
common practice, it could be “the last blow” to the drug industry’s at-
tempts to cure diseases of the developing world, which are overlooked 
even today.106 One Doctors Without Borders report reads, “For [some] 
diseases there is no treatment: no effective medicine exists and nobody 
is looking for a cure.”107 Indeed, pharmaceutical companies will not 
invest in new medicines unless there is an economic incentive to do so, 
and pervasive compulsory licensing may destroy this motivation.108 
 A related weakness is that compulsory licensing allows and perhaps 
even encourages free-riding.109 That is, an inventor invests a huge 
amount of money into researching and developing new medicines, and 
another company simply copies the formula and makes a significant 
                                                                                                                      
100 See Gov’t Accountability Office, U.S. Trade Policy on WTO Declaration on 
Access to Medicines May Need Clarification (Nov. 1, 2007) (detailing the United 
States’ argument that Thailand failed to follow proper procedure when issuing compul-
sory licenses). 
101 Id. 
102 See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 5, at 398. 
103 See id. 
104 See Rich, supra note 77, at C1; Boscariol, supra note 40. 
105 Shanker A. Singham, Competition Policy and the Stimulation of Innovation: TRIPS and 
the Interface Between Competition and Patent Protecition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 26 Brook. 
J. Int’l L.  392--93 (2000). 
106 See A Gathering Storm, supra note 1, at 100. 
107 Singham, supra note 105, at 392. 
108 See id. at 392--93. 
109 See id. at 363, 390. 
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profit from its sales.110 In this sense, some argue that compulsory licens-
ing is anti-competitive and takes an economic toll on society.111 
 Another realistic danger is that middle-income nations will take 
advantage of compulsory licensing to the detriment of poorer develop-
ing countries.112 As one member of the Gates Foundation stated, “Brazil 
is not Rwanda, which cannot afford to pay.”113 Further, some argue that 
the prices of drugs created by compulsory licensing are not low enough 
to justify the massive intrusion on patent rights.114 Indeed, the prices of 
generic drugs are reduced, but they are still far beyond the means of 
many developing nations.115 
C. Other Options: Parallel Importation and Tierred Pricing 
 Parallel importation is another method through which developing 
countries can obtain affordable pharmaceuticals.116 Supporters of par-
allel importation contend that once a product has been sold, manufac-
turers can no longer control what happens to it, and thus an importing 
country is free to resell the products at a higher price if it so chooses.117 
An attractive quality of parallel importation is that, unlike the type of 
compulsory licensing widely used in the world today, it does not require 
countries to have domestic manufacturing capabilities; rather, nations 
can simply import the cheapest version of a drug that they can find.118 
 The United States and other developed countries fundamentally 
oppose the practice of parallel importation, arguing that it destroys the 
monopoly a patent-holder has on its innovation and undermines the 
patent system.119 Opponents further hold that parallel importation 
eliminates any incentive to offer lower prices to developing nations, a 
tactic which is further described below.120 
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 Furthermore, it is debatable whether parallel importation even 
benefits poor patients in developing countries.121 The primary benefi-
ciaries of parallel importation are often the importers themselves, who 
proceed to raise the price of the drug and resell it to patients at an un-
reduced rate.122 In addition, the governments of some developing na-
tions are corrupt and the poor patients are often unable to reap the 
benefits of parallel importation.123 In other instances, developed coun-
tries purchase lower-priced drugs intended for the developing world, 
which is arguably unfair.124 
 Tiered pricing is another option, inextricably linked to parallel im-
portation, which may help make medicines more affordable in the de-
veloping world.125 In a tiered pricing scheme, drug companies charge 
less for patented medicines in developing nations than they do in devel-
oped countries.126 The TRIPS Agreement does not address tiered pric-
ing, although differential pricing can lead to parallel importation, as 
explained above.127 Tiered pricing already exists to a fairly large extent 
in the world, especially in relation to vaccines and contraceptives, but 
questions remain as to whether it can solve access problems in the de-
veloping world and whether it should be mandated by TRIPS.128 
 The chief argument against tiered pricing is that sales in develop-
ing countries would not be profitable for pharmaceutical companies, 
which rely on large profits to offset their exorbitant research and de-
velopment costs.129 Furthermore, tiered pricing also can negatively af-
fect profits in developed countries.130 When distributors in one nation 
realize that a drug is available for a lower price in another country, 
there is an incentive for the distributor to buy the drug cheaply and 
resell it for a higher price.131 Opponents of tiered pricing therefore ar-
gue that because it is difficult, if not impossible, to keep lower-priced 
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drugs within the country for which they are intended, this alternative is 
not a viable solution.132 
III. Analysis 
 As it exists, TRIPS fairly effectively achieves its dual goals of facili-
tating access to affordable medicines and protecting intellectual prop-
erty on an international scale.133 Nevertheless, one of TRIPS’ most sig-
nificant mechanisms, the Paragraph Six method of compulsory 
licensing, has been used on only one occasion.134  Therefore, it is pre-
mature to conclude that TRIPS has effectively struck a balance between 
its competing aims.135 That is, if developing nations routinely used the 
Paragraph Six provision and imported from other countries medicines 
created using compulsory licenses, the pharmaceutical industry would 
likely be outraged.136 Accordingly, TRIPS will need to be continuously 
evaluated in the coming years.137 In the meantime, prices are still high 
and many developing nations are too intimidated to issue compulsory 
licenses, and thus, several additional provisions would help improve 
medicine access.138 
 First, TRIPS or a supplementary WTO declaration should mandate 
a tiered pricing scheme based on gross domestic product.139 Tiered 
pricing allows nations with limited resources to pay lower prices for 
much-needed pharmaceuticals.140 Differential pricing already exists, 
but researching developing countries’ buying power and standardizing 
price tiers would benefit patients in poor nations.141 To offset higher 
prices for medicines in developing countries, an incentive such as tax 
credits should be offered to those nations.142 Research reflects that 
tiered pricing’s impact on pharmaceutical profits would be insignifi-
cant because eighty to ninety percent of global sales occur in the thirty 
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wealthy countries that make up the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD).143 That is, sales in developing coun-
tries are so low—likely because medicines are too expensive—that low-
ering prices in that sector of the world would not have a major impact 
on cost recovery.144 
 In concert with the pricing scheme, TRIPS also should reflect an 
explicit ban on parallel importation.145 This ban would allow the dif-
ferential pricing plan to function as intended because it would pre-
vent middle-income countries from abusing the system and buying 
cheaper drugs for purely commercial reasons.146 This would avoid loss 
of profits to pharmaceutical companies through their sales to devel-
oped nations because these nations would be prevented from import-
ing cheaper drugs from developing nations.147 The WTO also would 
need to develop regulations and sanctions to ensure that parallel im-
portation did not occur.148 Strict supply-chain management by pur-
chasers and use of different trademarks and packaging may also help 
prevent trade diversion.149 Thus, pharmaceutical companies could 
recoup their research and development costs and continue to develop 
new medicines in the meantime.150 
 A recent European Community (EC) regulation incorporated a 
similar combination of initiatives.151 In 2003, the EC adopted a differ-
ential pricing scheme, which was accompanied by a ban on trade diver-
sion (or parallel importation) of certain named medicines.152 The EC 
regulation has been criticized, however, for its rigid pricing scheme and 
the fully voluntary nature of participation.153 Indeed, only one pharma-
ceutical company used the pricing scheme in the year after its entry 
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into force.154 Thus, although it has not been a major success, the EC 
regulation forms a useful starting point for the WTO.155 
 Likewise, the International Intellectual Property Institute (IIPI), a 
non-profit organization devoted to promoting the use of the intellec-
tual property system as a tool for economic growth, has proposed a 
comparable plan.156 The IIPI’s proposal includes: (1) the division of 
nations into price-sectors based on ability to pay; (2) the adoption of 
appropriate prices for each segment; and (3) the development of a sys-
tem of international subsidies.157 The IIPI has stressed that a key to its 
plan is prohibition of parallel importation.158 
 As a final observation, generic drug makers operate sophisticated 
manufacturing facilities and their technological capabilities are be-
coming increasingly advanced.159 It is predicted that soon they will be 
able to produce novel drugs and obtain their own patents.160 Some-
what ironically, a board member of one of India’s large generic drug 
companies stated, “[w]e are very supportive of intellectual-property 
rights, as innovations must be given their reward.”161 This new devel-
opment bodes well for access to affordable medicines because many 
generic manufacturers are located in developing countries.162 
Conclusion 
 The TRIPS Agreement was a major accomplishment and the inter-
national community’s efforts to improve it, although often marked by 
controversy, indicate a crucial shift in focus from trade issues to public 
health.163 Despite its numerous shortcomings and drawbacks, compul-
sory licensing remains an invaluable tool, especially because the mere 
threat to use it has triggered pharmaceutical companies to significantly 
reduce their prices.164 Nevertheless, because many developing countries 
fear sanctions and business repercussions and refuse to issue compul-
sory licenses, additional measures are needed to ensure access to af-
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fordable HIV/AIDS medicines. A standardized tiered pricing scheme 
accompanied by a ban on parallel imports would help secure universally 
lower prices for developing countries. 
 An overarching criticism of TRIPS is that its flexibilities, such as 
compulsory licensing, are intended to be used only on a temporary ba-
sis, but the problem of access to affordable pharmaceuticals is struc-
tural and therefore permanent.165 Indeed, securing lower prices does 
not guarantee access to vital medicines, but it is a critical piece of a 
complex puzzle. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that the inter-
national community is prepared to amend the TRIPS agreement if the 
need arises. 
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